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Greedy Algorithms for Maximizing Nash Social Welfare
Siddharth Barman∗, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy†, Rohit Vaish‡
Abstract
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive
valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which
is the geometric mean of the valuations of the agents for their bundles. While the problem of
maximizing Nash social welfare is known to be APX-hard in general, we study the effectiveness
of simple, greedy algorithms in solving this problem in two interesting special cases.
First, we show that a simple, greedy algorithm provides a 1.061-approximation guarantee
when agents have identical valuations, even though the problem of maximizing Nash social wel-
fare remains NP-hard for this setting. Second, we show that when agents have binary valuations
over the goods, an exact solution (i.e., a Nash optimal allocation) can be found in polynomial time
via a greedy algorithm. Our results in the binary setting extend to provide novel, exact algorithms
for optimizing Nash social welfare under concave valuations. Notably, for the above mentioned
scenarios, our techniques provide a simple alternative to several of the existing, more sophisti-
cated techniques for this problem such as constructing equilibria of Fisher markets or using real
stable polynomials.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valu-
ations for the goods. The fairness of an allocation is quantified by its Nash social welfare [NJ50, KN79],
which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the agents under that allocation. The notion of Nash
social welfare has traditionally been studied in the economics literature for divisible goods [Mou04],
where it is known to possess strong fairness and efficiency properties [Var74]. Besides, this notion is
also attractive from a computational standpoint: For divisible goods, the Nash optimal allocation can
be computed in polynomial time using the convex program of Eisenberg and Gale [EG59].
For indivisible goods, Nash social welfare once again provides notable fairness and efficiency guar-
antees [CKM+16]. However, the computational results in this setting are drastically different from
its divisible counterpart. Indeed, it is known that the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare
for indivisible goods is APX-hard when agents have additive valuations for the goods [Lee17]. On
the algorithmic side, the first constant-factor (specifically, 2.89) approximation for this problem was
provided by Cole and Gkatzelis [CG15]. This approximation factor was subsequently improved to e
[AGSS17], 2 [CDG+17] and, most recently, to 1.45 [BKV17]. Similar approximation guarantees have
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also been developed for more general market models such as piecewise linear concave (PLC) utilities
[AGMV18], budget additive valuations [GHM18], and multi-unit markets [BGHM17]. By and large,
these approaches rely on either constructing an appropriate equilibrium of a Fisher market and later
rounding it to an integral allocation, or using real stable polynomials. Although these approaches of-
fer strong approximation guarantees in very general market models, they are also (justifiably) more
involved and often lack a combinatorial interpretation. Our interest in this work, therefore, is to un-
derstand the power of simple, combinatorial algorithms (in particular, greedy techniques) in solving
interesting special cases of this problem.
Our results and techniques We consider the Nash social welfare objective (NSW) as a measure
of fairness in and of itself, and develop greedy algorithms for maximizing NSW either exactly or
approximately. We focus on two special classes of additive valuations, namely identical valuations
(i.e., for any good j and any pair of agents i, k, the value of the good j for i is equal to the value of
the good for k; vi,j = vk,j) and binary valuations (i.e., for every agent i and good j, agent i’s value for
j is either 0 or 1; vi,j ∈ {0, 1}). The class of identical valuations is well-studied in the approximation
algorithms literature, and binary valuations capture the setting where each agent finds a good either
acceptable or not.
For identical valuations, we show that a simple greedy algorithm provides a 1.061-approximation
to the optimal Nash social welfare (Theorem 1). Note that the problem of maximizing Nash social
welfare remains NP-hard even for identical valuations (via a reduction from the Partition problem
[RR10]). Our algorithm (Algorithm 1) works by allocating the goods one by one in descending order
of value. At each step, a good is allocated to the agent with the least valuation. This implicitly
corresponds to greedily choosing an agent that provides the maximum improvement in NSW. We
show that the allocation returned by our algorithm satisfies an approximate version of envy-freeness
property (Lemma 1), and that any allocation with this property gives the desired approximation
guarantee (Lemma 2). We remark that a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) is already
known for this problem [NR14]. However, this scheme uses Lenstra’s algorithm for integer programs
[LJ83] as a subroutine, and hence is not combinatorial. Moreover, despite being polynomial time in
principle, the actual running time of such algorithms often scales rather poorly. By contrast, our
algorithm involves a single sorting step and at most one min(·) operation for each good, thus it
requires O(m logm+mn) time overall.
For binary valuations, we show that an exact solution to the problem (i.e., a Nash optimal allo-
cation) can be found by a greedy algorithm in polynomial time (Theorem 2). However, unlike the
algorithm for identical valuations which greedily picks an agent, our algorithm for binary valuations
makes a greedy decision with respect to swaps (or chains of swaps) between a pair of agents. A swap
refers to taking a good away from one agent and giving it to another agent. A chain of swaps refers
to a sequence of agents u1, u2, . . . , uℓ and goods j1, j2, . . . , jℓ−1 such that j1 is swapped from u1 to
u2, j2 is swapped from u2 to u3, and so on. Given any suboptimal allocation, our algorithm (Algo-
rithm 2) checks for every pair of agents whether there exists a chain of swaps between them that
improves NSW. The pair that provides the greatest improvement is chosen, and the corresponding
swaps made. We show that the algorithmmakes substantial progress towards the Nash optimal after
each such reallocation (Lemma 3), which provides the desired running time and optimality guaran-
tees. An interesting feature of our algorithm is that the guarantee for additive valuations extends to
a more general utility model where the valuation of each agent is a concave function of its cardinality
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(i.e., the number of nonzero-valued goods in its bundle).1 Prior work [DS15] has shown that a Nash
optimal can be found efficiently under binary valuations (via reduction to minimum-cost flow prob-
lem). However, these techniques crucially rely on valuations depending linearly on cardinality, and
it is unclear how to extend these to the aforementioned utility model. Our results, therefore, provide
novel, exact algorithms for maximizing Nash social welfare under concave valuations.
2 Preliminaries
Problem instance An instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 of the fair division problem is defined by (1) the set of
n ∈ N agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, (2) the set of m ∈ N goods [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and (3) the valuation
profile V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} that specifies the preferences of each agent i ∈ [n] over the set of goods [m]
via a valuation function vi : 2
[m] → Z+ ∪ {0}. Throughout, the valuations are assumed to be additive,
i.e., for any agent i ∈ [n] and any set of goodsG ⊆ [m], vi(G) :=
∑
j∈G vi({j}), where vi({∅}) = 0. We
use the shorthand vi,j instead of vi({j}) for a singleton good j ∈ [m]. We use Γi to denote the set of
goods that are positively valued by agent i, i.e., Γi := {j ∈ [m] : vi,j > 0}.
Binary and identical valuations We say that agents have binary valuations if for each agent i ∈ [n]
and each good j ∈ [m], vi,j ∈ {0, 1}. In addition, we say that agents have identical valuations if for
any good j ∈ [m] and any pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we have vi,j = vk,j . For identical valuations, we
will assume, without loss of generality, that the value of each good is nonzero.
Allocation An allocation A ∈ {0, 1}n×m refers to an n-partition (A1, . . . , An) of [m], where Ai ⊆ [m]
is the bundle allocated to the agent i. Let Πn([m]) denote the set of all n partitions of [m]. Given an
allocation A, the valuation of an agent i ∈ [n] for the bundle Ai is vi(Ai) =
∑
j∈Ai
vi,j . An allocation
is said to be non-wasteful if it does not assign a zero-valued good to any agent, i.e., for each agent i
and each good j ∈ Ai, we have vi,j > 0. We will use the terms allocation and partition interchangeably
whenever the set of goods [m] is clear from the context.
Nash social welfare Given an instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 and an allocation A, the Nash social welfare
of A is given by NSW(A) :=
(∏
i∈[n] vi(Ai)
)1/n
. An allocation A∗ said to be Nash optimal if A∗ ∈
argmaxA∈Πn([m])NSW(A). An allocation B is said to be a β-approximation (where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1) for the
instance I if NSW(B) ≥ β · NSW(A∗). For the approximation guarantees to be meaningful, we will
assume that the Nash optimal for any given instance has nonzero Nash social welfare.
3 Main Results
We provide two main results: a 1.061-approximation algorithm for identical valuations (Theorem 1),
and an exact algorithm for binary valuations (Theorem 2). The proofs of these results are presented
in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
Theorem 1 (Identical valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and identical valuations,
there exists a polynomial time 1.061-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization prob-
lem.
1Notice that for binary and additive utilities, the valuation of each agent is a linear function of its cardinality.
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Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm for Identical Valuations (Alg-Identical)
Input: An instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 with identical, additive valuations.
Output: An allocation A.
1 Order the goods in descending order of value, i.e., v(j1) ≥ v(j2) ≥ . . . v(jm) > 0.
2 Set A← (∅, ∅, . . . , ∅).
3 for ℓ = 1 tom do
4 Set i← argmink∈[n] v(Ak) // ties are broken lexicographically
5 Ai ← Ai ∪ {jℓ} // Allocate the good jℓ to the agent with the least valuation
6 end
7 return A
Theorem 2 (Binary valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, a
Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
4 Identical Valuations: Proof of Theorem 1
This section provides the proof of Theorem 1, which we recall below:
Theorem 1 (Identical valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and identical valuations,
there exists a polynomial time 1.061-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization prob-
lem.
Our proof of Theorem1 relies on two intermediate results: First, wewill show in Lemma 1 that the
allocation computed by the greedy algorithm (called Alg-Identical, given in Algorithm 1) satisfies
an approximate envy-freeness property called EFx, defined below. We will then show in Lemma 2
that any allocation with this property—in particular, the allocation computed by Alg-Identical—
provides a 1.061 approximation guarantee.
We start by describing the notion of envy-freeness and some of its variants.
Envy-freeness and its variants Given an instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 and an allocation A, we say that an
agent i ∈ [n] envies another agent k ∈ [n] if i prefers the bundle of k over its own bundle, i.e.,
vi(Ak) > vi(Ai). An allocation A is said to be envy-free (EF) if each agent prefers its own bundle over
that of any other agent, i.e., for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak). Likewise, an
allocation A is said to be envy-free up to the least positively valued good (EFx) if for every pair of agents
i, k ∈ [n], we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak \ {j}) for every j ∈ Ak such that vi,j > 0. The notion of EFx
first appeared in the work of Caragiannis et al. [CKM+16]. Plaut and Roughgarden [PR18] study the
existence of EFx allocations for special cases of the fair division problem.
We will now describe our algorithm called Alg-Identical.
Greedy algorithm for identical valuations Asmentioned earlier in Section 1, our algorithmAlg-Identical
(Algorithm 1) allocates the goods one by one in descending order of their value. In each iteration, a
good is assigned to the agent with the least valuation. Assigning goods in this manner ensures that at
each step, the algorithm picks the agent providing the greatest improvement in NSW. It is easy to see
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thatAlg-Identical runs in polynomial time. Our next result (Lemma 1) shows thatAlg-Identical
always outputs an EFx allocation.
Lemma 1. The allocation A returned by Alg-Identical is EFx.
Proof. LetAℓ be the allocation maintained byAlg-Identical at the end of the ℓth iteration. It suffices
to show that for each ℓ ∈ [m], if Aℓ−1 is EFx, then so is Aℓ.
Write jℓ to denote the good allocated in the ℓ
th iteration, and let i be the agent that receives this
good; thusAℓi = A
ℓ−1
i ∪{jℓ}. Notice that only the valuation of agent i is affected by the assignment of
jℓ, while the allocation any other agent k ∈ [n]\{i} is unchanged. Therefore, in order to establish that
Aℓ is EFx, we only need to consider agent i and show that v(Aℓi \{j}) ≤ v(A
ℓ
k) for all k ∈ [n] and each
j ∈ Aℓi . SinceAlg-Identical processes the goods in decreasing order of value, the good jℓ is the least
valued good in Aℓi . Thus, for any j ∈ A
ℓ
i , we have that v(A
ℓ
i \ {j}) ≤ v(A
ℓ
i \ {jℓ}) = v(A
ℓ−1
i ) ≤ v(A
ℓ
k)
for all k ∈ [n]; here, the last inequality follows from the agent selection rule of Alg-Identical, i.e.,
the fact that i ∈ argmink∈[n] v(A
ℓ−1
k ). This shows that A
ℓ must be EFx.
Our final result in this section shows that any EFx allocation provides a 1.061 approximation to
Nash social welfare when the valuations are additive and identical.
Lemma 2. Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 be an instance with additive and identical valuations, and let A be an EFx
allocation for I . Then, NSW(A) ≥ 11.061NSW(A
∗), where A∗ is the Nash optimal allocation for I .
Proof. For notational convenience, we reindex the bundles in the allocation A such that v(A1) ≥
v(A2) ≥ · · · ≥ v(An), where v denotes the (additive and identical) valuation function for all agents.
Let ℓ := mink v(Ak) denote the valuation of the least valued bundle under A (thus v(An) = ℓ).
For any agent k ∈ [n− 1] with two or more goods in Ak, EFx property implies that
v(Ak) ≤ 2ℓ. (1)
In particular, Equation (1) implies that if v(Ak) > 2ℓ for some k ∈ [n − 1], then Ak consists of exactly
one good. Let S := {k ∈ [n] : v(Ak) > 2ℓ} denote the set of agents with such singleton bundles.
Write s = |S| and let AS := {j1, j2, . . . , js} denote the set of goods owned by the agents in S.
For analysis, we will now consider a set of allocations where only the goods in AS are required to
be allocated integrally, and any other good can be allocated fractionally among the agents. Formally,
we define a partially-fractional allocation B ∈ [0, 1]n×m as follows: for every good j ∈ AS , Bi,j ∈ {0, 1}
for any agent i ∈ [n] subject to
∑
iBi,j = 1, and for any other good j ∈ [m] \ AS , Bi,j ∈ [0, 1] for
any agent i ∈ [n] subject to
∑
iBi,j = 1. We let F denote the set of all such partially-fractional
allocations, and let AF denote the Nash optimal allocation in F .2 Since all integral allocations belong
to F , we have NSW(AF ) ≥ NSW(A∗). Therefore, in order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show
that NSW(A) ≥ 11.061NSW(A
F ).
Define α := mink∈[n] v(A
F
k )/ℓ. Observe that all goods in AS , namely j1, j2, . . . , js, must belong to
separate bundles inAF . This is because the combined value of all goods in [m]\AS is strictly less than
2ℓ(n − s). Therefore, if two (or more) goods in AS belong to the same bundle in A
F (say, AFa ), then
there must exist another bundle in AF (say, AFb ) with value strictly less than 2ℓ. In that case, we can
simply swap the bundleAFb with one of the goods (of value more than 2ℓ) in A
F
a and strictly improve
NSW, which is a contradiction. Therefore, without loss of generality, each good in AS belongs to a
2The valuation of an agent under a fractional allocation B is given by v(Bi) =
∑
j
v(j)Bi,j .
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unique bundle in AF . Using this observation, we can reindex the bundles in AF such that ji ∈ A
F
i
for all i ∈ S.
It is easy to see that α ≥ 1.3 In addition, we can show that α < 2. Indeed, as argued above,∑
i>s v(A
F
i ) < 2ℓ(n − s). This implies that αℓ = mini v(A
F
i ) < 2ℓ, i.e., α < 2. Using this bound we
can establish a useful structural property of AF : For all i ∈ S, the bundles AFi are singletons (i.e.,
AFi = {ji} for all i ∈ S) and, for all k /∈ S, we have v(A
F
k ) = αℓ. This follows from the observation
that any bundle AFk in A
F which has a fractionally allocatable good (say, good j) is of value equal
to αℓ = mina v(A
F
a ); otherwise, we can “redistribute” j between A
F
k and argmink v(A
F
k ) to obtain
another fractional allocation with strictly greater NSW. Moreover, since for any i ∈ S, ji ∈ A
F
i and
v(ji) > αℓ (recall that α < 2), the bundle A
F
i does not contain a fractionally allocatable good. This, in
particular, implies that ∪i∈SA
F
i = AS . All the remaining goods in [m]\AS are fractionally allocatable,
and hence the bundles AFk for all k /∈ S are of value equal to αℓ. This structural property gives us the
following bound for NSW(AF ):
NSW(AF ) =

∏
i∈S
v(AFi ) ·
∏
i∈[n]\S
v(AFi )


1/n
=
(∏
i∈S
v(Ai) · (αℓ)
(n−s)
)1/n
. (2)
We will now provide a lower bound for NSW(A) that will allow us to prove the desired ap-
proximation guarantee. This is done by constructing an allocation A′ ∈ F such that NSW(A′) ≤
NSW(A). Along with Equation (2), this provides an analysis-friendly lower bound for the quantity
NSW(A′)/NSW(AF ).
We start with the initialization A′ ← A. Next, while there exist two agents i, k ∈ [n] such that
ℓ < v(A′i) < v(A
′
k) < 2ℓ, we transfer goods of value ∆ = min{v(A
′
i) − ℓ, 2ℓ − v(A
′
k)} from A
′
i (the
lesser valued bundle) to A′k (the larger valued bundle). Such a transfer is possible because the goods
in the bundles with value less than 2ℓ are allowed to be allocated fractionally. Notice that the Nash
social welfare does not increase as a result of this transfer. Also, it is easy to see that this process
terminates, since after each iteration of the while loop, either v(A′i) = ℓ or v(A
′
k) = 2ℓ or both, and
hence some agent can take no further part in any future iterations. Upon termination of the above
procedure, there can be at most one agent (say, r) such that v(A′r) ∈ (ℓ, 2ℓ); for every other agent
k ∈ [n] \ S, v(A′k) ∈ {ℓ, 2ℓ}.
Let T = {k ∈ [n] : v(A′k) ≥ 2ℓ} and let t = |T |. Notice that by construction of A
′, S ⊆ T ; hence,
s ≤ t. We then have the following bound on the Nash social welfare of the allocation A′:
NSW(A′) =

∏
i∈S
v(A′i) ·
∏
i∈T\S
v(A′i) ·
∏
i∈[n]\T
v(A′i)


1/n
≥
(∏
i∈S
v(Ai) · (2ℓ)
(t−s) · ℓ(n−t)
)1/n
. (3)
Let φ =
∑
k∈[n]\S v(Ak) denote the combined value of all goods except for those in the set AS . We
will now use the allocations AF and A′ to obtain upper and lower bounds for φ, which in turn will
help us achieve the desired approximation ratio for the allocation A.
First, recall that the goods in the set AS = {j1, j2, . . . , js} are allocated as singletons in A
F to the
3If α < 1, then it must be that v(AFn ) < ℓ, i.e. a nonzero amount of fractional good is taken away from the bundle An.
In that case, one can reassign (part of) this fractional good—currently assigned to one of the agents in [n− 1]— to AFn and
strictly improve the Nash social welfare, contradicting the assumption that AF is the Nash optimal in F .
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bundles i ∈ S . Along with the fact that v(AFk ) = αℓ for all k ∈ [n] \ S, this gives
φ =
∑
k∈[n]\S
v(AFk ) = (n− s) · αℓ. (4)
Next, in the allocation A′, each bundle corresponding to agents in T \ S is valued at exactly 2ℓ,
and that for each agent in [n] \ T (except for the agent r) is valued at exactly ℓ. By overestimating
v(A′r) to be 2ℓ, we get
φ ≤ 2ℓ(t+ 1− s) + ℓ(n− t− 1). (5)
Equations (4) and (5) together imply that
t− s
n− s
≥ α− 1−
1
n− s
. (6)
We can lower bound the quantity of interest NSW(A)
NSW(AF )
, as below:
NSW(A)
NSW(AF )
≥
NSW(A′)
NSW(AF )
≥
(∏
i∈S v(Ai) · (2ℓ)
(t−s) · ℓ(n−t)
)1/n
(∏
i∈S v(Ai) · (αℓ)
(n−s)
)1/n (from Equations (2) and (3))
=
(
2t−s
αn−s
)1/n
≥
(
2t−s
αn−s
)1/(n−s) (
since
(
2t−s
αn−s
)1/n
≤
NSW(A)
NSW(AF )
≤ 1⇒
2t−s
αn−s
≤ 1
)
≥
2α−1
α
(from Equation (6) and for large n)
≥
1
2
e ln 2 ≈
1
1.061
(minimum at α = 1/ ln 2 ≈ 1.44).
In the penultimate inequality, the reason for using the approximation 2α−1−
1
n−s ≈ 2α−1 is as follows:
Imagine constructing a scaled-up instance I ′ consisting of c copies of the instance I , where c is ar-
bitrarily large. Notice that I ′ has additive and identical valuations. Moreover, for any allocation A
that is a β-approximation for the instance I , the allocation B = (A,A, . . . , A) is β-approximation for
I ′. Similarly, A is EFx for I if and only if B is EFx for I ′. Finally, write n′, s′, α′, ℓ′ to denote the
analogues of n, s, α, ℓ in I ′. It is easy to see that n′ = cn, s′ = cs, α′ = α and ℓ′ = ℓ. Since the agent
with the least valuation in I (under allocation A) values his bundle at strictly below 2ℓ, we know
that s < n, and thus the quantity n′ − s′ = c(n − s) can be made arbitrarily large for appropriately
chosen c. We can therefore ignore the term 1n−s in the exponent of 2 without loss of generality. This
completes the proof of Lemma 2.
The following example shows that the approximation guarantee of Lemma 2 is almost tight.
Example 1 (Tightness of approximation factor forEFx allocations). Consider a fair division instance
with m goods (m is even) and n = 2 agents, where the (additive and identical) valuations are given
as follows: v(j1) = v(j2) = m − 2, and v(jℓ) = 1 for ℓ ∈ {3, 4, . . . ,m}. Notice that the allocation
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A = {(j1, j2), (j3, . . . , jm)} is EFx. Additionally, NSW(A) = ((2m− 4) · (m− 2))
1/2. It is also clear
that NSW(A∗) = 32(m− 2). The approximation ratio of A is given by
NSW(A)
NSW(A∗)
=
(
(2(m− 2)) · (m− 2)
(3(m− 2)/2) · (3(m− 2)/2)
)1/2
≈
1
1.0607
,
which closely matches the approximation guarantee of Lemma 2.
5 Binary Valuations: Proof of Theorem 2
This section provides the proof of Theorem 2, which we recall below:
Theorem 2 (Binary valuations). Given any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, a
Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Our proof of Theorem 2 relies on a greedy algorithm (Algorithm 2, hereafter referred to asAlg-Binary).
Starting from any suboptimal allocation, Alg-Binary identifies a pair of agents such that a chain of
swaps between them provides the greatest improvement in Nash social welfare (from among all
pairs of agents). Lemma 3 quantifies the progress towards the Nash optimal allocation made by
Alg-Binary in each step. As it turns out, the algorithm is required to run for at most 2m(n +
1) ln(nm) iterations. Overall, this provides a polynomial time algorithm for computing a Nash opti-
mal allocation for binary valuations. The detailed description ofAlg-Binary follows.
Greedy algorithm for binary valuations The input to Alg-Binary is an instance with additive
and binary valuations along with a suboptimal allocation, and output is a Nash optimal allocation.
At each step, the algorithm performs a greedy local update over the current allocation. Specifically,
given a partition A = (A1, A2, . . . , An), Alg-Binary constructs a directed graph G(A) as follows:
There is a vertex for each agent (hence n vertices overall), and between any pair of vertices u and v,
there are |Γv ∩ Au| parallel edges directed from u to v.
4 A directed edge (u, v) exists if and only if
there exists a good that is valued by v and is currently assigned to u. Observe that a directed simple
path P = (u1, u2, . . . , uk) in G(A) corresponds to a sequence of reallocations. For each directed edge
(ui, ui+1), there exists a good j ∈ Aui that can be reassigned to ui+1 via the updates Aui ← Aui \ {j}
and Aui+1 ← Aui+1 ∪ {j}.
Let A(P ) denote the partition obtained by reallocating goods along the path P = (u1, u2, . . . , uk).
Such a reallocation increases (decreases) the valuation of uk (u1) by one, while the valuations of all
intermediate agents u2, . . . , uk−1 are unchanged. The algorithm Alg-Binary greedily selects a spe-
cific path P in G(A), and reallocates the goods along P to obtain the partition A′ := A(P ). Lemma 3
below describes the progress towards the optimal solution made by such a reallocation.
Lemma 3. Given a suboptimal partition A, there exist agents u and v such that v is reachable from u inG(A),
and reallocating along any directed path P from u to v leads to a partition A′ := A(P ) that satisfies
lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A′) ≤
(
1−
1
m
)
(lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A)) .
Here A∗ denotes the Nash optimal partition.
4Recall that Γi := {j ∈ [m] : vi,j > 0}.
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Algorithm 2: Greedy Algorithm for Binary Valuations (Alg-Binary)
Input: An instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 with binary, additive valuations, and a partition A.
Output: A Nash optimal partition A′.
1 Set A0 ← A.
2 for i = 1 to 2m(n + 1) ln(nm) do
3 Construct the graph G(Ai−1) for the current partition Ai−1.
4 Set R← {(u, v) ∈ [n]× [n] : v is reachable from u in G(Ai−1)}.
5 for each (u, v) ∈ R do
6 Set Ai−1(u, v)← The partition obtained by reallocating along some path from u to v.
7 endfor
8 if max(u,v)∈R NSW(A
i−1(u, v)) > NSW(Ai−1) then
9 Update Ai ← arg max
Ai−1(u,v) : (u,v)∈R
NSW(Ai−1(u, v)).
10 else
11 return Ai−1
12 end
13 end
Remark 1. Note that there can be multiple paths P from u to v in G(A), and different goods that can
be reallocated along a fixed edge of P , which might lead to different partitions A(P ). However, the
Nash social welfare of any resulting partition is the same, since the valuation of u (v) goes down (up)
by one and that of every other agent remains the same. Hence, the choice of path between a fixed
pair of vertices is inconsequential.
In the remainder of this section, we will show that Lemma 3 can used to prove Theorem 2, fol-
lowed by a proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 3 ensures that if there does not exist an improving reallocation, then the
current allocation Ai−1 is optimal. Hence, for the rest of the proof, we will focus on the case wherein
the for-loop executes for all 2m(n+ 1) ln(nm) steps.
The update rule followed by Alg-Binary and Lemma 3 together guarantee that at the end of
iteration i, we have
lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(Ai) ≤
(
1−
1
m
)
(lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(Ai−1)).
Repeated use of the above bound gives
lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(Ai) ≤
(
1−
1
m
)i
(lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A0)).
Since Alg-Binary executes for 2m(n + 1) ln(mn) iterations, the difference between the optimal
partition A∗ and the partition A′ returned by the algorithm is given by
lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A′)
≤
(
1−
1
m
)2m(n+1) ln(nm)
(lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A0))
9
≤
1
e2(n+1) ln(nm)
(lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A0))
≤
1
(nm)2(n+1)
lnNSW(A∗)
≤
lnm
(nm)2(n+1)
(since NSW(A∗) ≤ m for binary valuations)
≤
1
nm2n
(since lnm ≤ m, and n,m ≥ 2)
<
1
n
ln
(
1 +
1
mn
)
(since ln(1 + x) > x2 for 0 < x < 0.5).
Thus,
∏
i∈[n] vi(A
∗
i ) <
∏
i∈[n] vi(A
′
i)
(
1 + 1mn
)
. We already know that
∏
i∈[n] vi(A
′
i) ≤
∏
i∈[n] vi(A
∗
i ).
Since the valuations are assumed to be integral, and
∏
i∈[n] vi(A
′
i) ≤ m
n, we have that NSW(A∗) =
NSW(A′). Hence, A′ is Nash optimal. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
We will now provide a proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. Our proof of existence of the desired path P in the graph G(A) is made convenient
by the formulation of another graphG∗(A). This graph is utilised only in the analysis of the algorithm
and never explicitly constructed.
Recall that A∗ refers to a Nash optimal allocation. Consider the directed graph G∗(A) consisting
of n vertices, one for each agent, and a directed edge (u, v) for each good j ∈ Au∩A
∗
v. The edge (u, v)
indicates that the good j must be transferred from u to v to reach the optimal partition A∗. Note that
the total number of edges in G∗(A) is at mostm.
Besides defining the graph G∗(A), we also classify the agents depending on their valuation rel-
ative to A∗. In particular, let E and D denote the set of agents with excess and deficit valuations
respectively, i.e., E := {u ∈ [n] : |Au| > |A
∗
u|} and D := {v ∈ [n] : |Av| < |A
∗
v|}.
5 Any agent
t ∈ [n] \ (E ∪ D) satisfies |At| = |A
∗
t |.
The remainder of the proof consists of two parts: First, we will show that the edge set of G∗(A)
can be partitioned into simple directed paths P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pk} and cycles C = {C1, C2, . . .} such
that each path Pi ∈ P starts at a vertex in E and ends at a vertex in D. Second, we will use this
decomposition to argue that one of the paths Pi ∈ P leads to a partition A
′ := A(Pi) that satisfies the
bound in Lemma 3. The lemmawill then follow by observing that the edges ofPi are also contained in
the graph G(A) constructed by Alg-Binary. Note that the existence of Pi shows that the end vertex
of Pi (say, v) is reachable from the start vertex of Pi (say, u) in G(A). As noted earlier in Remark 1,
reallocating along any path between u and v leads to the stated improvement in Nash social welfare.
We will start by proving the claim about decomposition of the edge set of G∗(A). Consider a
graph H∗ where for each vertex u of G∗(A), we include max(indegree(u),outdegree(u)) vertices,
say {u1, u2, . . .}. Suppose the vertex u has ℓ incoming edges and ℓ′ outgoing edges in G∗(A). To
construct H∗, first we pick an arbitrary one-to-one assignment between the incoming edges and
{u1, u2, . . . , uℓ}. Similarly, each outgoing edge gets uniquely assigned to one of the vertices in {u1, u2, . . . , uℓ
′
}.
With these assignments in hand, for every directed edge e = (u, v) in G∗(A), we include a directed
edge (ui, vj) in H∗ if and only if e is assigned to ui and vj . It is easy to see that each edge in H∗
corresponds to an edge in G∗(A) and vice versa.
5For binary valuations and a non-wasteful allocation A, we have vi(A) = |A| for each agent i ∈ [n].
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Notice that each vertex in H∗ has at most one incoming and at most one outgoing edge. Further-
more, if ui is a source in H∗, then u ∈ E . Similarly, if vj is a sink in H∗, then v ∈ D. These properties
together imply that the edges inH∗ can be partitioned into paths and cycles such that each path starts
at a vertex ui with u ∈ E and ends at a vertex vj with v ∈ D. The correspondence between the edges
ofH∗ and G∗(A) gives us the desired collection of paths P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pk} and cycles C in G
∗(A).6
The aforementioned properties also imply that the paths in H∗ are edge-disjoint, therefore k ≤ m.
We will now show that for one of the paths Pi ∈ P in G
∗(A) (and therefore, also in G(A)), the
partition A′ := A(Pi) achieves the bound in Lemma 3. First, observe that reallocating along a cycle
in G∗(A) does not change the Nash social welfare. Hence, in order to reach a Nash optimal partition
starting from A, it suffices to reallocate goods along the paths P1, P2, . . . , Pk . Moreover, since the
paths in P are edge disjoint in the graphH∗, they correspond to reallocation of disjoint sets of goods.
This means that the reallocations corresponding to a path Pi ∈ P can be performed independently of
those corresponding to another path Pj ∈ P.
Next, consider the sequence of partitions B1, B2, . . . , Bk, obtained by successively reallocating
along the paths P1, P2, . . . , Pk. That is, B
1 = A(P1), B
2 = B1(P2) and so on. Thus, the parti-
tion Bk must be Nash optimal, i.e., NSW(A∗) = NSW(Bk). Consider the telescoping sum given
by lnNSW(A∗) − lnNSW(A) =
∑k−1
i=1 lnNSW(B
i) − lnNSW(Bi−1), where B0 = A. Since k ≤ m,
there must exist i ∈ [k] such that
lnNSW(Bi)− lnNSW(Bi−1) ≥
1
m
(lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A)) . (7)
We will now show that the partition A′ := A(Pi) satisfies
lnNSW(A′)− lnNSW(A) ≥ lnNSW(Bi)− lnNSW(Bi−1). (8)
Indeed, recall that each path in P starts at a vertex in E and ends at a vertex in D. Hence, as we pro-
ceed through reallocations corresponding to P1, . . . , Pk , the cardinality of the set of goods assigned
to any agent u′ ∈ E is non-increasing and that of v′ ∈ D is non-decreasing. Therefore, if u (v) is
the start (end) vertex of Pi, then ku ≥ k
′
u and kv ≤ k
′
v , where ku, kv, k
′
u and k
′
v are the number of
goods assigned to u and v in partitions A andBi−1 respectively. Since lnNSW(Bi)− lnNSW(Bi−1) =
ln(k′u−1)+ln(k
′
v+1)−(ln k
′
u+ln k
′
v) and lnNSW(A
′)−lnNSW(A) = ln(ku−1)+ln(kv+1)−(ln ku+ln kv),
the concavity of ln(·) implies Equation (8). Finally, Equations (7) and (8) give us the desired relation
lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A′) ≤
(
1−
1
m
)
(lnNSW(A∗)− lnNSW(A)).
Notice that the proof of Lemma 3 works exactly the same way when for each agent i, vi(Ai) =
fi(|Ai|) for some concave function fi. That is, the valuation of an agent can be an (agent-specific)
concave function of the cardinality (i.e., the number of nonzero valued goods owned by the agent).
Thus, Alg-Binary can find a Nash optimal allocation in polynomial time even when the valuation
functions of agents are concave in cardinality. This observation is formalized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. Given any fair division instance with concave and binary valuations, a Nash optimal allocation
can be computed in polynomial time.
6We can ensure that the paths in P are simple by removing cycles from each Pi and placing such cycles in C.
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Remark 2. A well-studied class of valuation functions captured by Corollary 1 is that of budget-
additive valuations [LLN01]. Under this class, the valuation of an agent i ∈ [n] for a set of goods
G ⊆ [m] is given by vi(G) := min{ci,
∑
j∈G vi,j}, where ci > 0 is an (agent-specific) constant, known
as the utility cap.
Garg et al. [GHM18] recently gave a (2.404 + ε)-approximation algorithm for this class (for any
ε > 0). For binary valuations, a budget-additive valuation function turns out to be a special case
of the concave-in-cardinality functions mentioned above. Hence, by Corollary 1, a Nash optimal
allocation can be found in polynomial time when the valuations are binary and budget-additive. It
is unclear whether the existing techniques for finding a Nash optimal allocation under binary and
additive valuations [DS15] admit a similar generalization.
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